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LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION. By Melvin 
L Uroftky. Boston: Little, Brown. 1981. Pp. vi, 183. $11.95. 
Throughout a lifetime that included a career as a private lawyer, in-
volvement in national and international political issues and a twenty-three 
year tenure on the Supreme Court, Louis Brandeis was constantly active in 
reform. In.Louis .D. Brandeis and the Progressive Tradition, Melvin Urofsky 
attempts to demonstrate an essential consistency in Brandeis' philosophy 
and his approach to reform throughout those years. Urofsky does not un-
dertake an exhaustive history of Brandeis' reform activities. Instead, Urof-
sky adopts a thematic approach, identifying various strains of thought 
underlying Brandeisian reform and documenting the recurrence of those 
ideas in each phase of his career. This thematic approach results in an 
oversimplification of Brandeis' philosophy and reform methods. Though 
adequate as an introduction to Brandeis and his beliefs, this approach is 
likely to disappoint readers seeking a more comprehensive treatment of the 
subject. 
According to Urofsky, Brandeis' political and social philosophy re-
flected that of the progressive movement. Brandeis, contrary to his critics' 
allegations, did not desire radical change in American society (p. 18). In 
fact, Brandeis was committed to the free enterprise system in which he and 
his family had prospered. But Brandeis recognized defects in the market 
system, most of which were caused, he believed, by industrialization. Bran-
deis saw large industry as a corrupting force that degraded the laborers 
responsible for its success and inhibited the economic freedom of the com-
mon man. Brandeis sought a return to an earlier America, when businesses 
were small and hard work and merit ensured advancement. In this attempt 
to return to the past, Brandeis and the progressives were fundamentally 
~nservative, not radical (pp. 18-21). In Urofsky's view, Brandeis consist-
ently adhered to this conservative philosophy from his childhood until his 
death. 
'µrofsky's conception of Brandeis' philosophy has been criticized as sim-
plistic.1 By portraying Brandeis as committed to certain "immutable val-
ues" (p. 1) cherished by the progressives, Urofsky discounts the possibility 
of growth and development in Brandeis' outlook. On the contrary, it seems 
clear that development did occur. Allon Gal points out Brandeis' change 
from mugwump to progressive, and notes that Urofsky ignores this transi-
tion completely.2 Urofsky himself notes that Brandeis "imbibed" the val-
ues of Bostonians after moving to that city (p. 4) and changed his position 
on several issues, particularly Zionism (p. 90). 
These changes, moreover, were the natural corollary of Brandeis' world 
view. His orientation toward facts made this growth in philosophy inevita-
ble. As Urofsky emphasizes, Brandeis believed that the law should grow 
out of the facts of each situation; indeed, Brandeis' stands on issues were so 
I. Gal, Book Review, 68 J. AM. HlsT. 708, 709 (1981). 
2. Id 
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fact-specific that they were often considered inconsistent with each other.3 
It is difficult to imagine a man committed to learning from the particular 
facts of a situation clinging to an unchanging set of values for an entire 
lifetime, particularly in light of the many different social, economic and 
political circumstances Brandeis experienced. In addition to being inaccu-
rate, this simplification limits Urofsky's analysis. By insisting that Brandeis 
subscribed consistently to the progressive philosophy, Urofsky fails to illu-
minate Brandeis' attitudes toward issues outside the range of progressive 
ideology. As Gal points out, Urofsky's analysis sheds no light on Brandeis' 
attitude toward the New Deal and the issues it raised because such issues 
were never considered during the life of the progressive movement.4 
Within the context of this static progressive philosophy, Urofsky em-
phasizes various methods common to Brandeisian reform. As previously 
noted, one of the most widely recognized Brandeisian characteristics was an 
emphasis on facts. Brandeis believed that all law must be firmly based on 
the facts of particular situations; law divorced from the facts was essentially 
dead (p. 50). Urofsky presents examples of Brandeis' appetite for facts 
from all phases of his career. As a private lawyer in Boston, Brandeis made 
an effort to know the facts of his client's business as well as, if not better 
than, the client. He felt that in order to serve as an effective counselor, a 
lawyer had to impress clients with "superior knowledge" and "know [cli-
ents'] affairs better than [do] they" (p. 7). As the "[p]eople's [a]ttorney" (p. 
47) in Muller v. Oregon,5 Brandeis succeeded in persuading the Supreme 
Court to uphold an Oregon statute prohibiting workdays of longer than ten 
hours for women. Of his one-hundred page brief, only two pages were de-
voted to legal citations; the remainder was devoted to an exhaustive presen-
tation of statistics concerning women and the effects oflong workdays (pp. 
51-53). Finally, as a Supreme Court Justice, Brandeis advocated and at-
tempted to apply a "living law." In his second dissent from a decision by 
the Court, Brandeis stated that "the judgment should be based upon a con-
sideration of relevant facts, actual or possible-ex factor jus oritur [the law 
arises out of the fact]. That ancient rule must prevail in order that we may 
have a system of living law."6 In illustrating Brandeis' use of facts, Urofsky 
is neither profound nor original. Nevertheless, his point is made clearly and 
effectively. 
Another characteristic of Brandeisian reform was the offering of a rem-
edy for every evil attacked. This practice distinguished Brandeis from other 
progressive reformers of his day, many of whom showed no capacity for 
devising realistic solutions. Again Urofsky uses several examples to illus-
trate his point. Brandeis proposed the creation of savings bank insurance as 
an alternative to the corrupt industrial workers' life insurance policies (pp. 
31-39); he introduced sliding scale rates to the public utility industry in Bos-
ton to combat inefficiency and high rates (pp. 26-30); and he suggested the 
institution of a "preferential union shop" and a protocol to handle labor 
grievances as a solution to the major conflicts in the New York garment 
3. See A. MAsoN, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 5 (1946). 
4. See Gal, supra note 1, at 708-09. 
5. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
6. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 600 (1917). 
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industry (pp. 62-67). Also indicative of Brandeis' impulse to provide reme-
dies was his frequent suggestion to clients that he be "counsel to the situa-
tion" rather than advocate of one side (p. 12). Lacking ties to one side of a 
conflict, Brandeis was free to search out lasting solutions. To Urofsky, 
Brandeis always undertook reform in a comprehensive manner. To attack 
an evil without providing a remedy would have been inadequate. 
Recently, the most widely publicized aspect of Brandeisian reform has 
been the use of surrogates.7 Brandeis began to use surrogates when his per-
sonal secretary, Alice Grady, became Deputy Commissioner of the savings 
bank insurance system. Grady provided a constant link to the system 
through which Brandeis could monitor its progress and make suggestions 
for its improvement (p. 39). But the use of surrogates did not flourish until 
Brandeis became a Supreme Court Justice and propriety forced him to take 
a less active role in reform activities. At this time, according to Urofsky, 
Felix Frankfurter was "undoubtedly [Brandeis'] most important surrogate" 
(p. 155). Brandeis gave Frankfurter a salary to support his reform activities; 
in return Frankfurter served "as a conduit for funneling information from a 
variety of reform groups to Brandeis, advising him of their problems and 
progress and in tum conveying his advice" (p. 156). 
Frankfurter was not Brandeis' only surrogate during his Supreme Court 
years. Brandeis turned to his family in his efforts to improve the University 
of Louisville Law School (p. 148) and relied on Zionist allies to orchestrate 
and accomplish the ouster of the corrupt Lipsky Administration of the Zi-
onist Organization of America (pp. 152-56). Urofsky does not discuss the 
ethical problems arising from this use of surrogates by a sitting Supreme 
Court justice8 and does not undertake a detailed analysis of Brandeis' fun-
neling of funds and advice through such lieutenants. In the context of 
Urofsky's thematic examination of Brandeisian reform, the use of surro-
gates is simply evidence of Brandeis' continuing involvement in reform ac-
tivities even when he could no longer do so openly. 
This thematic approach enables Urofsky to provide a coherent view of a 
complicated life. Ultimately, however, Urofsky's approach is disap-
pointing. In detailing these themes, Urofsky omits details and inconsisten-
cies and thus fails to provide a complete picture of Brandeis' reform. For 
instance, in emphasizing Brandeis' ability to find consistently "reasonable" 
and "workable" solutions (p. 15), Urofsky quickly passes over Brandeisian 
reforms that failed. Rather than analyze these failures and Brandeis' reac-
tion to them, Urofsky either blames the failure on others or states, without 
much further explanation, that the reform did not succeed. As a result, 
Urofsky neglects a significant part of Brandeis' development as a reformer. 
Similarly, Urofsky states that Brandeis experienced difficulties in making 
the transition from progressive advocate to impartial judge. Urofsky states 
that Brandeis made "several mistakes" and occasionally "violated his own 
canons of conduct" (p. 122), but the book does not examine those mistakes. 
Brandeis' errors in this transitional period, like his failures in reform, could 
reveal much about the nature of the man. In his insistence on showing 
7. See B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982) (reviewed in this 
volume). 
8. See Wheeler, Book Review, 81 MICH. L. REV. (1983). 
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consistency and success in Brandeis' reform, Urofsky sacrifices a more com-
plete understanding of the Justice's complex character. 
Nevertheless, Urofsky's portrait of Brandeisian reform is a useful addi-
tion to the literature, albeit in a limited way. Other books are more de-
tailed,9 providing fuller portraits of Brandeis and his involvement in 
reform. These books are also of more use as research tools since assertions 
and quotations are documented; Urofsky does not use footnotes and pro-
vides only a brief note on sources. Detailed books, however, are not neces-
sarily satisfactory introductions. Louis JJ. Brandeis and the Progressive 
Tradition can fill this role. Urofsky's simplification, a liability for one seek-
ing a complete understanding of Brandeis, is not necessarily detrimental in 
an introduction. Urofsky presents a clear, concise and generally accurate 
view of Brandeis, uncluttered by inconsistencies and extensive detail. 10 
Urofsky's book should suffice for the reader seeking an overview of 
Brandeisian reform. 11 
9. See, e.g., A. MAsON, supra note 3; A. MAsoN, BRANDEIS: LAWYER AND JUDGE IN THE 
MODERN STATE (1933). 
10. Urofsky has written another book surveying Brandeis' involvement as a reformer. M. 
UROFSKY, A MIND OF ONE PIECE: BRANDEIS AND THE AMERICAN REFORM (1971). Louis J) • 
.Brandeis and the Progressive Tradition is a refinement of that work and an improvement upon 
it. 
11. This book is also reviewed in 68 J. AM. HIST. 708 (1981); 86 AM. HIST. REv. 942 (1981). 
